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FORFEITURE BY WRONGDOING: A
PANACEA FOR VICTIMLESS DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE PROSECUTIONS
ANDREW KING-RIESt
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Wash-
ington' dramatically impacted the domestic violence community. 2 In
Crawford, the Court reasserted the supremacy of the Confrontation
Clause over the evidentiary rules pertaining to hearsay.3 In addition,
the Court established the rule that testimonial hearsay statements of
witnesses will only be admissible if subjected to the opportunity for
cross-examination. 4 The Crawford decision has the potential to de-
stroy prosecutors' abilities to use victimless domestic violence prosecu-
tions to combat domestic violence.5 Of recent vintage, victimless
prosecution is a highly effective tool against domestic violence, pre-
cisely because a victim's statements, admitted through hearsay excep-
tions, allow the State to proceed even when the victim is unable to
participate in the prosecution.6
The Court's decision in Crawford threw victimless prosecutions
into uncertainty, largely due to the Court's refusal to determine
whether traditional excited utterances, present sense impressions,
and statements to medical personnel constitute "testimonial" state-
ments.7 This uncertainty surrounding the heart, and thus the future,
of victimless prosecutions has sparked considerable discussion as to
t Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Montana University School of Law; A.B.,
Brown University, 1988; J.D., Washington University in St. Louis, 1993. I owe many
thanks to Kristin King-Ries for her wonderful editing assistance and encouragement
and to Kim McKelvey for her outstanding research assistance.
1. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2. Myrna S. Raeder, Domestic Violence, Child Abuse, and Trustworthiness Excep-
tions After Crawford, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2005, at 24; Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Bat-
terers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 749-50 (2005).
3. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50-51, 68-69 (2004).
4. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54-56.
5. Lininger, 91 VA. L. REV. at 752, 752 n.26 ("Crawford calls into question many of
the strategies previously used by prosecutors in domestic violence cases.").
6. Raeder, CRIM. JUST. at 24; Amy Karan & David M. Gersten, Domestic Violence
Hearsay Exceptions in the Wake of Crawford v. Washington, Juv. & FAM. JUST. TODAY,
Summer 2004, at 20, 21. See also Lininger, 91 VA. L. REV. at 752 n.31 (discussing state
legislative efforts-pre-Crawford-to expand the use of hearsay exceptions in domestic
violence prosecutions).
7. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68; Lininger, 91 VA. L. REV. at 766.
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how best to respond to Crawford.8 Some of this discussion has focused
on the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing. 9 Although incidental to its
holding and discussion, the Crawford Court expressly recognized the
rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing as an exception to the Confrontation
Clause.- 0 This rule is an exception to the Confrontation Clause rules
so potentially devastating to victimless domestic violence prosecu-
tions. Under forfeiture by wrongdoing-codified as Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(6)-the defendant forfeits his right to confront a wit-
ness against him when he engages in conduct that makes it "impossi-
ble or infeasible for the witness" to testify at the trial." The Crawford
Court recognized that the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing "extin-
guishes Confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds."12
Many defendants charged with crimes of domestic violence en-
gage in wrongdoing designed to make it impossible for their victims to
testify against them. 13 Through threats, intimidation, financial con-
trol, and violence, domestic violence defendants prevent victims from
8. See, e.g., Donna D. Bloom, "Utter Excitement" About Nothing: Why Domestic
Violence Evidence-Based Prosecution Will Survive Crawford v. Washington, 36 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 717 (2005); Lininger, 91 VA. L. REV. 747.
9. Lininger, 91 VA. L. REV. at 807-11; Paul W. Grimm and Jerome E. Deise, Jr.,
Hearsay, Confrontation, and Forfeiture by Wrongdoing: Crawford v. Washington, a Re-
assessment of the Confrontation Clause, 35 U. BALT. L.F. 5 (2004); Chris Hutton, Sir
Walter Raleigh Revived: The Supreme Court Revamps Two Decades of Confrontation
Clause Precedent in Crawford v. Washington, 50 S.D. L. REV. 41, 71-72 (2005). See also
the following domestic violence cases in which prosecutors have sought to use forfeiture
by wrongdoing: People v. Jiles, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 790, 796 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); People v.
Baca, No. E032929, 2004 WL 2750083, at *10-12 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2004); Gonzalez
v. State, 155 S.W.3d 603, 609-11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
10. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62. Interestingly, the Court recognized forfeiture by
wrongdoing but did not cite to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) which states the
following:
Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness: (6) Forfeiture by wrongdoing. A state-
ment offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing
that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a
witness.
Instead, the Court cited to Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). For a more
detailed discussion of Reynolds and the possible significance of the Court's election not
to cite FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6), see infra note 152. While recognizing the importance of
this distinction, this Article will largely focus on FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).
11. Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and the Definition of Chutzpa, 31 ISR. L.
REv. 506, 516 (1997). See also supra note 10.
12. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
13. Lininger, 91 VA. L. REV. at 768-69 (discussing research indicating that between
80% and 90% of domestic violence victims recant or refuse to participate in the prosecu-
tion and stating "[tihe reasons why victims refuse to cooperate with the prosecution are
manifold, but chief among them is the risk of reprisals by the batterers."); Naomi R.
Cahn & Lisa G. Lerman, Prosecuting Woman Abuse, in WoMAN BATTERING: POLICY RE-
SPONSES 102 (Michael Steinman ed., 1991) (stating "[miany victims who become wit-
nesses in criminal cases against their abusers are subject to threats, retaliation, and
intimidation to coerce their noncooperation with prosecutors."); Lisa Marie De Sanctis,
Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice for Victims of Domestic
[Vol. 39
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testifying in a significant number of domestic violence prosecutions. 14
In fact, it was the success of these efforts-preventing victims from
participating in prosecutions-that spawned the victimless prosecu-
tion in the first instance. 15 Ironically, Crawford may have placed vic-
timless prosecutions in jeopardy and provided the solution at the same
time.16
In this Article, I explore whether the rule of forfeiture by wrong-
doing is the post-Crawford panacea for victimless domestic violence
prosecutions. In Section II, I briefly discuss the Crawford decision
and the revitalization of the Confrontation Clause. I also highlight
Crawford's recognition of the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing and the
traditional concept of forfeiture by wrongdoing. In Section III, I pre-
sent difficulties with the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing in the do-
mestic violence context. In section IV, I propose solutions to these
difficulties along with additional requirements that are necessary
when applying the rule in domestic violence cases being tried without
the victim testifying in court.
Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359, 367 (1996) (stating victims do not cooperate with
the prosecution in 80% to 90% of domestic violence cases).
14. Adam M. Krischer, Though Justice May Be Blind, It Is Not Stupid: Applying
Common Sense to Crawford in Domestic Violence Cases, PROSECUTOR, Dec. 2004, at 14,
15 (stating "[t]he Quincy Probation Project, which tracked court-restrained male abus-
ers, found that close to half of the victims reported that their abusers had threatened
physical violence if they continued to cooperate with prosecution efforts. Threats from
abusers to their victims are not limited to physical harm. Forty-two percent of victims
reported economic threats and 25 percent were threatened with the loss of their chil-
dren, either through kidnapping or exaggerated claims of unfitness made to child pro-
tective services."); Randal Fritzler & Leonore Simon, Creating a Domestic Violence
Court: Combat in the Trenches, CT. REV., Spring 2000, at 28, 33 (stating batterers
threaten retaliatory violence in nearly 50% of domestic violence cases and 30% of batter-
ers assault their victims while awaiting trial on a prior violent incident); Edna Erez &
Joanne Belknap, In Their Own Words: Battered Women's Assessment of the Criminal
Processing System's Responses, 13 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 251, 252 (1998) (stating "[m]any
battered women who attempt to use the system face a significant threat of retaliation.
Often the victim is in more danger when she chooses to leave the relationship or when
she participates in the criminal prosecution."); MATTHEW J. WmSE, THE NON-PARTICI-
PATING VICTIM: PROVING THE CASE WITHOUT THE VICTIM'S TESTIMONY 5 (Battered Wo-
men's Justice Project ed., 1998).
15. KRISTIN LITTLE ET AL., ASSESSING JUSTICE SYSTEM RESPONSE TO VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 42 (1998) (noting the U.S. Department of Justice advocating prosecu-
tion of domestic violence cases through use of hearsay rules instead of reliance on victim
testimony). Efforts like these resulted in great numbers of domestic violence cases be-
ing tried without the testimony of the victim. DONALD J. REBOVICH, PROSECUTION RE-
SPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: RESULTS OF A SURVEY OF LARGE JURISDICTIONS 176 (Eve
S. Buzawa et al. eds., 1996).
16. State v. Hale, 691 N.W.2d 637, 652 (Wis. 2005) (Prosser, J., concurring) (rea-
soning "M[because the effect of the Crawford decision is to exclude certain testimonial
hearsay that heretofore was thought to be admissible, it is vital for courts to enforce
[forfeiture by wrongdoing] to assure the integrity of criminal trials."). See also Lininger,
91 VA. L. REV. at 750 (discussing how the Crawford decision impeded domestic violence
prosecutors in Washington, California, and Oregon).
2006]
HeinOnline  -- 39 Creighton L. Rev. 443 2005-2006
CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW
Specifically, I propose that, when the victim refuses to testify, the
prosecution be required to meet two procedural safeguards. First, the
State must establish by a preponderance of the evidence the wrongdo-
ing creating the forfeiture by demonstrating either (1) specific evi-
dence of threats if the victim were to report the violence to authorities
or testify at trial or (2) the existence of a battering relationship built
on power and control dynamics. 1 7 Second, after establishing the
wrongdoing creating the forfeiture, the statements the State seeks to
introduce from the absent victim must satisfy a reliability determina-
tion, essentially a hearsay exception or other indicia of reliability.' 8
In this way, I suggest that the criminal justice system can strike the
appropriate balance between preserving the critical tool of victimless
domestic violence prosecutions and maintaining confidence in verdicts
reached in those prosecutions.
II. CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON AND THE REVITALIZATION
OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court dramatically revi-
talized the Confrontation Clause and restored it to a place of promi-
nence in criminal prosecutions. 19 For the twenty-four years prior to
Crawford, starting with Ohio v. Roberts,20 the Supreme Court had
largely collapsed the Confrontation Clause into the hearsay rules. 2 1
The Crawford Court separated the Confrontation Clause from the
rules regarding hearsay and elevated a Confrontation Clause analysis
above a hearsay analysis. 22
In Ohio v. Roberts, the Court held that statements of unavailable
witnesses could be admitted at trial-and satisfy the Confrontation
Clause-if they were reliable.2 3 According to the Court, statements
were reliable if they either met a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or
had "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."24 The "firmly
rooted hearsay exception" largely became synonymous with portions
17. See infra notes 148, 150, 181 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
19. Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 755
(2005).
20. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
21. Myrna S. Raeder, Domestic Violence, Child Abuse, and Trustworthiness Excep-
tions After Crawford, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2005, at 24; Richard D. Friedman, Confron-
tation and the Definition of Chutzpa, 31 ISR. L. REV. 506, 509 (1997) (stating "[in recent
years, the Supreme Court has shown a tendency to construe [the Confrontation Clause]
nearly in conformity with the hearsay sections of the Federal Rules of Evidence."); Akhil
Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 697 (1996) (referring
to the marriage of hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause as a "shotgun wedding").
22. Lininger, 91 VA. L. REV. at 765.
23. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
24. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
[Vol. 39
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of Rules 80325 and 80426 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 2 7 The "par-
ticular guarantees of trustworthiness" issue was largely equated with
the residual hearsay exception codified as Rule 80728 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. In essence, the Court found that the Confrontation
Clause posed no additional obstacle to the admission of an out-of-court
statement by an unavailable witness other than the satisfaction of
particular hearsay rules. 29 For twenty-four years, the Ohio v. Roberts
test governed the admissibility of statements from witnesses who did
not testify at trial. 30
Many in the academic and legal community criticized the Ohio v.
Roberts decision.3 1 The criticism largely focused on three areas.
25. FED. R. EVID. 803 identifies exceptions to the hearsay rule of FED. R. EVID. 802
in which the availability of the declarant is immaterial. See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 502
U.S. 346, 356 (1992); Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d 809, 830 (9th Cir. 2004).
26. FED. R. EVID. 804 creates limited exceptions to the hearsay rule when the de-
clarant is unavailable. See e.g., State v. Small, 830 A.2d 423, 431-32 (Me. 2003); People
v. Meredith, 586 N.W.2d 538, 541-42 (Mich. 1998).
27. United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1356 (8th Cir. 1976) (stating "existing
decisional authority recognizes that the accused's right of confrontation is not violated
by the admission of hearsay statements as dying declarations, prior recorded testimony
of an unavailable witness, a declaration by a co-conspirator in furtherance of the con-
spiracy, recorded past recollection and spontaneous exclamations.") (citations omitted).
See also Lininger, 91 VA. L. REV. at 757-58 (discussing Supreme Court decisions).
28. FED. R. EVID. 807 replaced FED. R. EVID. 803(24) and 804(b)(5). FED. R. EVID.
807 states the following:
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 but having equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay
rule, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a
material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is
offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through rea-
sonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of
justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. How-
ever, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the propo-
nent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial
or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to
meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of
it, including the name and address of the declarant.
Fed. R. Evid. 807.
See e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 218 F.3d 1243, 1246 (11th Cir. 2000); United States
v. Bryce, 208 F.3d 346, 350-51 (2d Cir. 1999).
29. Carol A. Chase, The Five Faces of the Confrontation Clause, 40 Hous. L. REV.
1003, 1054-58 (2003) (arguing the Confrontation Clause poses no "meaningful barrier to
admission of hearsay evidence" except to prior testimony of the witness); Randolph N.
Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV.
557, 558 (1988) (stating "[tihe confrontation clause is no longer a constitutional right
protecting the accused, but essentially a minor adjunct to evidence law.").
30. Raeder, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2005, at 24.
31. Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and Criminal Procedure: First Principles,
in FIRST PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE : A MISTAKE? 125-31
(Yale University Press 1997); Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic
Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1013 (1998); Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Confrontation and
Hearsay: Exemptions from the Constitutional Unavailability Requirement, 70 MINN L.
REV. 665 (1986); Myrna S. Raeder, Hot Topics in Confrontation Clause Cases and Creat-
20061
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First, commentators found difficult the Court's equating a portion of
the Constitution with statutory evidentiary rules.3 2 Second, many
commentators and courts struggled with the uncertainty surrounding
the Roberts test, especially the "particular guarantees of trustworthi-
ness" portion.3 3 Courts often reached divergent results on the same
facts; circuits split on the weight and significance of various factors in
assessing reliability.3 4 Finally, critics contended that the Roberts test
was both overbroad and underinclusive. 35 As to overbreadth, com-
mentators argued that the test's grounding in the hearsay rules
meant every hearsay statement implicated the Confrontation Clause,
even when the particular hearsay statement did not raise a core con-
frontation concern. 36 Regarding underinclusiveness, many raised the
concern that admitting statements on a finding of reliability did not
adequately protect the central issue of confrontation of witnesses. 3 7
Despite this criticism, the Supreme Court did not readdress the Rob-
erts test until Crawford v. Washington.38
In Crawford, the Supreme Court was confronted with a case that
highlighted most of the difficulties with the Roberts test. In the sum-
mer of 1999, Sylvia Crawford, the defendant's wife, led the defendant
to the residence of Kenneth Lee. 39 The defendant accused Lee of at-
tempting to rape Sylvia.40 During the ensuing altercation-witnessed
by Sylvia-the defendant stabbed Lee. 4 1 The State charged Crawford
with assaulting Lee,4 2 and he argued self-defense. 43 When the prose-
ing a More Workable Confrontation Clause Framework Without Starting Over, 21 QUIN-
NIPIAC L. REV. 1013, 1014 (2002); Chase, 40 Hous. L. REV. at 1054.
32. Friedman, 86 GEo. L.J. at 1014-1022. Members of the Court also expressed
this idea. See Justice Thomas's concurrence in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
33. Kirkpatrick, 70 MINN. L. REV. at 682; Lininger, 91 VA. L. REV. at 760.
34. The progression of the Crawford case is a telling example of this difficulty with
the Roberts test. See infra text accompanying note 56. Justice Scalia strongly criticized
Roberts on this point. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 (arguing "[tihe framework is so unpre-
dictable that it fails to provide meaningful protection from even core confrontation
violations.").
35. Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2004, at 4,
5. Justice Scalia also identified this concern in the Crawford decision. According to
Justice Scalia, the Roberts test was both overinclusive and underinclusive. Crawford,
541 U.S. at 60.
36. Friedman, CR1M. JUST., Summer 2004, at 5.
37. Friedman, 86 GEo L.J. at 1022.
38. That is not to say that individual members did not try. Justice Thomas, with
Justice Scalia, raised the issue in his concurrence in White. White, 502 U.S. 346, 358-66
(Thomas, J., concurring). Justices Breyer, Thomas, and Scalia also challenged Roberts
in Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 140-44 (1999) (concurring opinions).
39. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38.
40. Id. at 38.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 40.
43. Id.
446 [Vol. 39
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cution subpoenaed his wife, the defendant invoked his marital privi-
lege and precluded Sylvia from testifying in court. 44 The prosecution
sought to admit the custodial tape-recorded statement Sylvia gave to
the police implicating the defendant.4 5 Applying the Roberts test, the
trial court found that the tape-recorded statement did not satisfy a
firmly rooted hearsay exception. 46 Rather, the trial court admitted
the taped statement after determining that it had "particular guaran-
tees of trustworthiness."4 7 The trial court found the statement was
trustworthy for several reasons: the statement corroborated Craw-
ford's self-defense, Sylvia was an eyewitness to the assault, she de-
scribed recent events, and she was questioned by a "neutral" police
officer. 48
The Washington Court of Appeals, in a two-to-one decision,
reached a contrary conclusion as to the trustworthiness of Sylvia's
statement.4 9 The Appellate Court applied a nine-part test to deter-
mine "particular guarantees of trustworthiness": (1) whether the de-
clarant, at the time of making the statement, had an apparent motive
to lie; (2) whether the declarant's general character suggests trustwor-
thiness; (3) whether more than one person heard the statement; (4)
the spontaneity of the statement; (5) whether trustworthiness is sug-
gested from the timing of the statement and the relationship between
the declarant and the witness; (6) whether the statement contains ex-
press assertions of past fact; (7) whether the declarant's lack of knowl-
edge could be established by cross-examination; (8) the remoteness of
the possibility that the declarant's recollection is faulty; and (9)
whether the surrounding circumstances suggest that the declarant
misrepresented the defendant's involvement. 50 Looking at the same
facts as the trial court and attempting to identify whether the state-
ment was reliable, the majority of the Appeals Court found Sylvia's
statement was unreliable: she had a clear motive to lie; she gave sev-
eral different versions of the same statement; her statement re-
counted past facts in response to police questions, was often evasive,
and was not spontaneous; and she claimed to have shut her eyes dur-
ing the attack.5 1
The Washington Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's de-
cision, determining that Sylvia's statement was sufficiently trustwor-
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 41.
50. Id.
51. Id. The Court of Appeals did find that Sylvia's statement was taken on the
same day as the assault and could be considered trustworthy in that respect. Id.
20061
HeinOnline  -- 39 Creighton L. Rev. 447 2005-2006
CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW
thy to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. 5 2 Instead of applying the
nine-factor test, the Washington Supreme Court adopted the appellate
court's dissent and applied an alternative test for determining reliabil-
ity.5 3 According to Washington law, an "interlocking" confession is
deemed reliable and is an alternative to the nine-factor test.5 4 The
Washington Supreme Court determined Sylvia's statement was "in-
terlocking" with her husband's statement. The court, therefore, rein-
stated defendant's conviction. 5 5
In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court faced three differ-
ent applications of the Roberts test, which on the same facts produced
three different results. Interestingly, the Court acknowledged that,
even withstanding the lower courts' competing readings of reliability,
the Court could have reached the result of reversing the conviction
using the Roberts test.56 Instead of pursuing this course, the Court
elected to jettison the Roberts test and revitalize the Confrontation
Clause. Holding that hearsay rules and reliability no longer deter-
mined Confrontation Clause issues, the Court elevated the constitu-
tional confrontation issues analysis above the hearsay analysis. 5 7 The
Court held that the sole question for purposes of the Confrontation
Clause is whether the defendant has an opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant's testimonial statement. 58
In making this dramatic departure from prior Confrontation
Clause case law, the Court left unanswered many important ques-
tions, such as what constitutes a "testimonial" statement, what quali-
fies as "prior cross examination," and what governs admissibility of
non-testimonial statements. 59 The scope and impact of the Crawford
decision will not be fully resolved until courts, particularly the Su-
preme Court, have answered these questions. For the purposes of this
Article, it will be assumed that when the full impact of the Crawford
decision has been realized, domestic violence prosecutors will not be
able to introduce absent victims' statements, and, therefore, will be
unable to pursue victimless prosecutions in a pre-Crawford fashion.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 41-42.
54. Id. at 42.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 67.
57. Id. at 61. See also Lininger, 91 VA. L. REV. at 765.
58. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
59. Many of these questions have been identified and pursued elsewhere and are
beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Amber Allred Furbee, Legal Crossroads: The
Hearsay Rule Meets the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause in Crawford v. Wash-
ington, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 999, 1061-62 (2005) (asserting the writers of the 6th
Amendment wanted to exclude information given under oath, not the broad category of
testimony); Lininger, 91 VA. L. REV. at 762-63 (discussing the failure of Crawford to
define "testimonial").
[Vol. 39
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In preparation for such a result, the other unanswered question
that must be explored is the extent to which Crawford countenances
exceptions to the Confrontation Clause. The Court seemed to identify
two: dying declarations60 and forfeiture by wrongdoing. 6 1 Forfeiture
by wrongdoing may present an opportunity for domestic violence pros-
ecutors to combat domestic violence under the worst of circumstances:
namely, when the victim is unable to participate in the prosecution.
III. FORFEITURE BY WRONGDOING
A. CRAwFoiD's "RECOGNITION" OF FORFEITURE BY WRONGDOING
In revitalizing the Confrontation Clause, the Crawford Court also
recognized forfeiture by wrongdoing as an exception to the Confronta-
tion Clause. Given the uncertainty of the true parameters of the
Crawford decision and its potential impact on domestic violence prose-
cutions, the Court's "acceptance" of forfeiture by wrongdoing is signifi-
cant. Prosecutors and law-makers across the country are already
looking for solutions to Crawford's revitalization of the Confrontation
Clause's stringent testimonial requirements.6 2
The Crawford Court mentioned forfeiture by wrongdoing only
briefly and indicated its acceptance only parenthetically. 63 In its dis-
cussion of the Roberts test, the Court determined that the test had an
inherent failing: it created a "surrogate" means of determining relia-
bility.6 4 The Court held that this conflicted with the means mandated
by the Confrontation Clause: cross-examination. 6 5 The Court distin-
60. The Court did not decide if dying declarations are an exception to the Confron-
tation Clause. Rather, the Court in a footnote discussed that the dying declaration
hearsay exception might survive even after Crawford. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6.
Although the Court's discussion was clearly dicta, it has been adopted by several lower
courts. See, e.g., People v. Gilmore, 356 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1031 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005);
People v. Monterroso, 101 P.3d 956, 971-72 (Cal. 2004).
61. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
62. Several jurisdictions have adopted an equivalent to FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6)
since 1997: Delaware (DEL. R. EVID. 804(b)(6)); Hawaii (HAw. R. EVID. 804(b)(7)); Michi-
gan (MicH. R. EVID. 804(b)(6)); North Dakota (N.D. R. EVID. 804(b)(6)); Ohio (OHIo EVID.
R. 804(b)(6)); Pennsylvania (PA. R. EVID. 804(b)(6)); South Dakota (S.D. R. EVID.
804(b)(6)); Tennessee (TENN. R. EVID. 804(b)(6)); Virgin Islands (FED. R. EVID.
804(b)(6)); Virginia (FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6)); and West Virginia (W.VA. FED. EVID. R.
804(b)(6)). Since the Crawford decision, two additional states have adopted forfeiture
by wrongdoing statutes: Kentucky and Vermont (VT. R. EVID. 804(b)(6)). In addition,
prosecutors are beginning to use forfeiture by wrongdoing in domestic violence cases.
See, e.g., People v. Giles, 102 P.3d 930 (Cal. 2004); People v. Jiles, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 790,
796 (Ct. App. 2004); United States v. Mayhew, No.2:03-cr-165, 2005 WL 1847239, at *6
(S.D. Ohio Aug. 5, 2005). See also Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford,
91 VA. L. REV. 747, 807-11 (2005) (arguing states should adopt equivalent statutes to
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) to aid in prosecuting defendants who manipulate witnesses).
63. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
64. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
65. Id.
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guished the Roberts test from an exception to the Confrontation
Clause, which does not "purport to be an alternative means of deter-
mining reliability."6 6 The Court placed forfeiture by wrongdoing in
this category and stated, "the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which
we accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable
grounds."67
Significantly, the Court's discussion of forfeiture was merely by
way of contrasting example. The Court did not provide any discussion
of forfeiture or provide guidance on the parameters of its "acceptance"
of the rule. As with much of the Crawford decision, the Court's dra-
matic transformation of the landscape appears persuasively simple
and yet is extraordinary in its unexplored complexity. To begin to un-
derstand the levels of complexity, it is essential to delve more fully
into the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.
B. THE HISTORICAL BEGINNINGS OF FORFEITURE BY WRONGDOING
In its brief mention of forfeiture by wrongdoing, the Crawford
Court references a single case: the Supreme Court's 1879 decision in
Reynolds v. United States.68 Reynolds represents the first time the
Supreme Court recognized the concept of forfeiture by wrongdoing.
In Reynolds, the Territory of Utah charged George Reynolds with
bigamy for marrying Amelia Jane Schofield while still being married
to Mary Ann Tuddenham. 69 At trial, the State introduced evidence of
several unsuccessful attempts to serve a subpoena for Amelia Jane
Schofield. The police officer testified that he was familiar with Scho-
field and was aware that she lived with the defendant. The constable
stated that he had gone to the defendant's residence and the defen-
dant informed him that Schofield would not appear at the trial. In
addition, the officer spoke with defendant's first wife and learned that
Schofield had not been residing at the defendant's for two or three
weeks. 70 Over the defendant's Confrontation Clause objection, the
trial court allowed Schofield's testimony from an earlier trial of the
defendant. 7 1 The jury convicted and the defendant appealed.7 2
On appeal, the Supreme Court acknowledged that while the Con-
stitution guarantees a defendant the right to confront witnesses
against him, "if a witness is absent by [the defendant's] own wrongful
procurement, [the defendant] cannot complain if competent evidence
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59 (1879).
69. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 146, 148.
70. Id. at 148-49.
71. Id. at 150.
72. Id. at 150-51.
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is admitted to supply the place of that which he has kept away."7 3
The Court found that this concept had been recognized in England in
166674 and well-established since:
So that now, in the leading text-books, it is laid down that if a
witness is kept away by the adverse party, his testimony,
taken on a former trial between the same parties upon the
same issues, may be given in evidence. 7
5
Later in its decision, the Court stated that the subject of unlawful pro-
curement was a matter of fact. 76 On the facts of the case, the Court
found the evidence properly established the defendant procured Scho-
field's absence. 7 7 The Court held the State had produced sufficient
evidence of the defendant's involvement in Schofield's absence to shift
the burden to the defendant of showing he "had not been instrumental
in concealing or keeping the witness away."7 8 The Court then deter-
mined the defendant failed to offer any explanation for Schofield's ab-
sence.79 The Court also held that Schofield's prior testimony was
properly admitted:
It was testimony given on a former trial of the same person
for the same offence, but under another indictment. It was
substantially testimony given at another time in the same
cause. The accused was present at the time the testimony
was given, and had full opportunity of cross-examination.
This brings the case clearly within the well-established
rules.8 0
As first recognized by the Supreme Court, therefore, forfeiture by
wrongdoing involved three components. First, the State had to pro-
duce evidence of the defendant's involvement in the witness's absence.
Second, at some point, the burden shifted to the defendant to rebut
the accusation of involvement with the missing witness. Third, once
the defendant's involvement was established, the absent witness's tes-
timony could be admitted as long as it was "competent" evidence.
8 1
While "competent" evidence is not explained, the facts of Reynolds es-
tablish that a witness's prior testimony, subject to cross-examination
by the defendant, constituted "competent" evidence.8 2
73. Id. at 158.
74. Lord Morley's Case, 6 State Trials 770 (1666).
75. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158-59.
76. Id. at 159.
77. Id. at 159-60.
78. Id. at 160.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 160-61.
81. Id. at 158.
82. Id. at 160-61.
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C. EVOLVING FORFEITURE DOCTRINE
As the first Supreme Court case to recognize forfeiture by wrong-
doing, Reynolds is a good starting point for an examination of forfei-
ture.8 3 The doctrine, however, evolved significantly from 1879 until
its codification as Federal Rule of Evidence ("FRE") 804(b)(6) in
1997.84 The road from Reynolds to the evidentiary rule is fascinat-
ing.8 5 Equally fascinating is the divergence between the definition of
forfeiture in Reynolds and the current doctrine in FRE 804(b)(6).8 6
The current rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing is set forth in Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6). FRE 804(b) creates exceptions to the
hearsay rule8 7 for certain statements of unavailable witnesses, such
as former testimony, dying declarations, and statements against in-
terest.8 8 In addition, FRE 804(b)(6) creates a hearsay exception for
forfeiture by wrongdoing:
A statement offered against a party that has engaged or ac-
quiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, pro-
cure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.8 9
The intent of the Rules Committee in drafting 804(b)(6) was two-
fold. First, the Rules Committee sought to bring some unity to a prin-
ciple recognized by the Supreme Court and every circuit court that
had encountered it, but applied in differing fashion.90 Second, the
Committee sought to formalize a response to behavior designed to un-
dermine the criminal justice system.9 1 Starting in the 1960s and
1970s, the federal government placed greater emphasis on the prose-
cution of organized crime and drug activity.9 2 As many of these com-
83. Id. at 158.
84. Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) states the following:
Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness: (6) Forfeiture by wrongdoing. A state-
ment offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing
that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a
witness.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).
85. See James F. Flanagan, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing and Those Who Acquiesce in
Witness Intimidation: A Reach Exceeding Its Grasp and Other Problems With Federal
Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), 51 DRAKE L. REV. 459 (2003).
86. For purposes of this Article, I will largely confine my discussion to forfeiture by
wrongdoing as set out in FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6). See supra note 10.
87. "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Con-
gress." FED. R. EVID. 802.
88. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1), (2), (3).
89. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).
90. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) advisory committee's note, at 322 (citing circuit court
cases).
91. Id.
92. Flanagan, 51 DRAKE L. REV. at 466; Joan Comparet-Cassani, Balancing the
Anonymity of Threatened Witnesses Versus a Defendant's Right of Confrontation: The
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plex prosecutions involved reluctant witnesses who experienced great
pressure not to testify, forfeiture by wrongdoing became more central
to prosecution efforts.9 3
In drafting FRE 804(b)(6), the Rules Committee was particularly
influenced by the prosecution in United States v. Mastrangelo.9 4 Mas-
trangelo was charged with multiple counts of conspiracy to traffic
drugs. 95 Mastrangelo's only connection to the conspiracy was his
purchase of four trucks which, when later seized by federal agents,
were loaded with drugs.96 James Bennett testified before a grand jury
that he sold Mastrangelo the four trucks.9 7 Bennett also cooperated
with the FBI to record a conversation with Mastrangelo during which
Mastrangelo threatened Bennett not to disclose that Mastrangelo was
the purchaser of the trucks.98 On his way to testify in Mastrangelo's
trial, Bennett was murdered.99 Finding that Mastrangelo was in-
volved with the murder of Bennett, the trial court allowed the jury to
hear Bennett's grand jury testimony.10 0 The jury convicted Mas-
trangelo; on appeal he asserted that the admission of Bennett's testi-
mony violated his confrontation right. 10 1 The Second Circuit adopted
the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing and sought to implement the rule
to "[disicourage behavior which strikes at the heart of the system of
justice itself."10 2 In its comments to FRE 804(b)(6), the Rules Com-
mittee quoted this language from Mastrangelo, and emphasized that
the rule was designed as a "prophylactic rule to deal with abhorrent
behavior."'0 3
The adoption of the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing fulfilled both
interests of the Rules Committee. Prosecutors using forfeiture by
wrongdoing have been able to "avoid resolution of the difficult legal
Waiver Doctrine After Alvarado, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1165, 1204-08 (2002); Paul T.
Markland, Admission of Hearsay Evidence Where Defendant Misconduct Causes the Un-
availability of a Prosecution Witness, 43 Am. U. L. REV. 995, 995-96 (1994) (collecting
examples of witness intimidation); Michael H. Graham, Witness Intimidation, 12 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 239, 241-42 (1984) (discussing studies of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s that
reported abundance of witness intimidation that caused witnesses not to testify at
trial).
93. See Graham, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. at 242-43 (discussing witness intimidation
in context of organized crime); Comparet-Cassani, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. at 1203-04
(discussing statistics demonstrating that the problem of witness intimidation is na-
tional in scope).
94. 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982). See Flanagan, 51 DRAKE L. REV. at 476.
95. United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 271 (2d Cir. 1982).
96. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 271.
97. Id. at 271.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 271-72.
101. Id. at 272.
102. Id. at 273.
103. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) advisory committee's notes, at 322.
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and constitutional issues arising under the confrontation clause and
[the hearsay rules]" 10 4 raised by unavailable witnesses and to pursue
cases otherwise beyond their reach.10 5 Second, forfeiture has coa-
lesced into a largely consistent doctrine.' 0 6
D. CURRENT ELEMENTS OF FORFEITURE BY WRONGDOING
Since the adoption of FRE 804(b)(6), forfeiture by wrongdoing has
evolved into a four-part test. To satisfy the forfeiture by wrongdoing
rule, the State must establish the unavailability of the declarant, that
the defendant acted with the intent of preventing the declarant from
testifying, that the declarant is expected to be a witness, and that the
defendant's acts caused the unavailability.10 7
1. Unavailability of the Declarant
Typically, a declarant is seen as unavailable when the declarant
dies,' 08 refuses to testify,10 9 forgets, 1 10 or is not served properly by
the prosecution."' If the government relies on its inability to locate a
witness, the government must establish diligent good faith efforts to
procure the witness."t 2 Often, a refusal to testify will only rise to the
level of unavailability if the witness refuses to testify after a grant of
immunity or contempt order. 1 13
104. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 272.
105. Comparet-Cassani, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. at 1194 (stating "[w]itness intimida-
tion has a profound and serious impact on the ability of government to enforce its laws
and on society's confidence in the ability of the government to protect its citizens.").
106. See Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1201 (6th Cir. 1982) (stating "[tihe theory
of the cases appears to be that the disclosure of relevant information at a public trial is
a paramount interest, and any significant interference with that interest, other than by
exercising a legal right to object at the trial itself, is a wrongful act.").
107. Flanagan, 51 DRAKE L. REV. at 479-89. Interestingly, Hawaii's forfeiture by
wrongdoing statute does not have an express intent or purpose requirement. See HAW.
R. EVID. 804(b)(7).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v.
White, 116 F.3d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271 (1st Cir.
1996).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1992); State v. Hallum,
606 N.W.2d 351, 355-57 (Iowa 2000).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Amaya, 533 F.2d 188, 190-91 (5th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Torrez-Ortega, 184 F.3d 1128, 1134 n.3 (10th Cir. 1999).
111. See generally Milton Roberts, Annotation, Sufficiency of Efforts to Procure
Missing Witness'Attendance to Justify Admission of His Former Testimony, 3 A.L.R. 4th
87 (2005) (collecting cases).
112. Roberts, Annotation, 3 A.L.R. 4th 87.
113. Flanagan, 51 DRAKE L. REV. at 481.
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2. Intent to Prevent Testimony
For the forfeiture rule to apply, the defendant must have acted
with the appropriate mental state: the defendant must have intended
to prevent the declarant from testifying. Importantly, the intent ele-
ment can be satisfied even when the intent to prevent the witness
from testifying was merely one of the defendant's motivations. 1 14 As
stated by the Second Circuit in United States v. Dhinsa:
The government need not, however, show that the defen-
dant's sole motivation was to procure the declarant's absence;
rather, it need only show that the defendant "was motivated
in part by a desire to silence the witness." 11 5
3. Declarant is Expected to be a Witness
This element is easily satisfied when the declarant is listed as a
government witness. However, courts have also found that "witness"
can include those people who have the potential to testify against the
defendant at some future time.1 16
4. The Defendant's Acts Caused the Declarant's Unavailability
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) states that the defendant's
misconduct must "procure the witness's absence."11 7 The government
is required to establish the link between the defendant's actions and
the witness's absence. 11 8
5. Unsettled Areas of Forfeiture by Wrongdoing
While courts are largely in agreement about the above four basic
elements of the forfeiture by wrongdoing rule, several issues remain in
dispute. First, the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing has not tradition-
ally required any reliability considerations. 119 Rather, satisfying the
elements of forfeiture have been deemed to satisfy both hearsay and
confrontation concerns. 120 However, some courts and commentators
114. United States v. Gray, 405 F.3d 227, 242 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v.
Johnson, 219 F.3d 349, 356 (4th Cir. 2000)).
115. United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 654 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Houlihan,
92 F.3d at 1279).
116. Flanagan, 51 DRAKE L. REV. at 484.
117. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
118. Flanagan, 51 DRAKE L. REV. at 484-87.
119. Id. at 461 (reasoning "[u]nlike othr hearsay exceptions, the misconduct excep-
tion expressed in Rule 804(b)(6) is not based on any argument that the circumstances in
which the statements were made make them reliable.").
120. Lininger, 91 VA. L. REv. at 810 (arguing for states to adopt 804(b)(6) so that the
rule "could serve as both a statutory hearsay exception and an exception to the constitu-
tional confrontation requirement."); see also Aguiar, 975 F.2d at 47 (affirming the dis-
trict court's admission of hearsay testimony to prove witness tampering as well as an
2006]
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have expressed uneasiness about the apparent limitlessness of admis-
sible testimony given an established forfeiture by wrongdoing. 12 1
Second, a majority of courts require the government establish the
link between the defendant's conduct and the witness's unavailability
by a preponderance of the evidence. 122 For the most part, courts have
settled on this level of proof because of their cognizance of, and efforts
to fulfill, the policy considerations behind the rule itself.1 23 The Fifth
Circuit, however, has applied the clear and convincing evidence
standard. 124
Third, there is disagreement in the courts as to the issue of "boot-
strapping,"125 or whether the statement itself can establish the
wrongdoing. 12 6 The primary concern is the judge considers the state-
ment itself in determining the admissibility of the statement. 127 Sev-
eral courts require the wrongdoing be established without reference to
underlying drug conspiracy, and stating that "[a] defendant who procures a witness's
absence waives the right of confrontation for all purposes with regard to that witness.").
121. See Lininger, 91 VA. L. REV. at 811 (stating "[t]o be sure, prosecutors must not
become carried away with the notion that forfeiture by wrongdoing can circumvent the
Confrontation Clause in every domestic violence prosecution."); State v. Ivy, No. W2003-
00786-CCA-R3-DD, 2004 WL 3021146, at *14 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 30, 2004) (finding
the trial court abused its discretion in admitting hearsay statements under forfeiture by
wrongdoing because of a concern that a "broad application of the Rule would lead to
wide-spread abuse by parties seeking admission of out-of-court statements of an un-
available declarant."); People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 850 (2004) (noting the gov-
ernment needed a statutory hearsay exception in addition to the doctrine of forfeiture
by wrongdoing).
122. Cotto v. Herbert, 331 F.3d 217, 235 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Scott, 284
F.3d 758, 762 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1031 (2002); United States v.
Zlatogur, 271 F.3d 1025, 1028 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 946 (2002); United
States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 820-21 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Emery, 186
F.3d 921, 926-27 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1130 (2000); United States v.
White, 116 F.3d 903, 911-12 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 960 (1997); Steele v. Tay-
lor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1202-03 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1053 (1983); State v.
Hallum, 606 N.W.2d 351, 355-56 (Iowa 2000); State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789, 794 (Kan.
2004); State v. Alvarez-Lopez, 98 P.3d 699, 704 (N.M. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1177
(2005).
123. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) advisory committee's notes at p. 322.
124. See United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 631 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
825 (1982).
125. "Bootstrapping" in the forfeiture context is when the charged crime itself pro-
vides the factual basis for the finding of forfeiture by wrongdoing. Lininger, 91 VA. L.
REV. at 808.
126. Compare United States v. Mikos, No. 02 CR 137-1, 2004 WL 1631675, at *5
(N.D. Ill. 2004) (reasoning "[a]llowing otherwise inadmissible evidence to prove a defen-
dant's guilt in a capital case based upon a judge's pretrial conclusion that the defendant
is in fact guilty of that very crime appears to us to be a slippery slope."), with People v.
Jiles, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 790, 796 (Ct. App. 2004); People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843,
849-50 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789, 793-94 (Kan. 2004).
127. Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and the Definition of Chutzpa, 31 IsR. L.
REV. 506, 522 (1997).
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the statement whose admission is being sought. 1 28 Other courts, how-
ever, have determined that "bootstrapping" merely calls upon the
judge to consider the same evidence for two different purposes. 129
As to whether the act for which the defendant is on trial can also
be the misconduct that forms the basis for the application of the forfei-
ture by wrongdoing rule, Professor Richard Friedman, an expert on
the Confrontation Clause, argues persuasively that forfeiture by
wrongdoing should apply "reflexively." 130 According to Friedman, a
"reflexive" forfeiture principle applies "even when the act that ren-
dered the declarant-victim unable to testify was the same criminal act
for which the accused in now on trial."13 1
Friedman acknowledges the primary argument against a "reflex-
ive" application of forfeiture is that the judge would be required to
conclude-when determining admissibility of the unavailable wit-
ness's statements-that the defendant is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged. 13 2 According to Friedman, however, this diffi-
culty does not undermine the principles underlying forfeiture by
wrongdoing; rather, it highlights the need for sufficient procedural
safeguards to ensure "a high probability that the principle is invoked
only when appropriate."13 3
Friedman contends that the reality of the trial largely addresses
the need for procedural safeguards and resolves any concerns with
"reflexive" application of the forfeiture by wrongdoing principle.' 3 4
Typically, the judge determines the evidentiary issue outside the pres-
ence of the jury, and the jury-unaware of the court's evidentiary rul-
ing-determines whether the prosecution has carried its burden. 135
In the vast number of forfeiture cases, therefore, there are two sepa-
rate fact-finders resolving separate issues. In the bench trial situation
in which the judge determines both evidentiary issues and guilt,
Friedman contends that judges are often called upon to make simi-
larly linked decisions and are quite familiar with applying two differ-
ent standards of proof to factually similar issues.13 6 According to
128. This is the issue that is before the California Supreme Court in People v. Giles,
19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, review granted, 102 P.3d 930 (Cal. Dec 22, 2004) (No. S129852)
(stating "[d]oes the doctrine apply where the alleged "wrongdoing" is the same as the
offense for which defendant was on trial?").
129. State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789, 793-94 (Kan. 2004); United States v. Emery, 186
F.3d 921, 926-27 (8th Cir. 1999) (analogizing to procedure for co-conspirator
statements).
130. Friedman, 31 IsR. L. REv. at 521-24.
131. Id. at 508.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 523.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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Friedman, "[i]t is not a charade, therefore, to say that, although the
two questions may be identical, they are tried separately for separate
purposes." 13 7
IV. DOES FORFEITURE BY WRONGDOING WORK IN THE
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROSECUTION?
The Supreme Court's decision in Crawford created great uncer-
tainty surrounding the future of victimless domestic violence prosecu-
tions. Since that decision, several commentators have made passing
suggestion that forfeiture by wrongdoing is the post-Crawford pan-
acea for victimless domestic violence prosecutions. 138 Given our un-
derstanding that domestic violence batterers pressure, threaten,
coerce, and assault victims in order to prevent their testimony,13 9
along with our awareness that domestic violence defendants are often
successful in these efforts, 140 forfeiture by wrongdoing does appear to
be the perfect avenue for admitting victims' statements at trial when
the defendant has prevented the victims from testifying. As it stands,
however, the forfeiture rule does not adequately resolve two concerns:
first, the frequent need to proceed in prosecutions without the victim-
witness; and second, the need to inspire public confidence in jury
verdicts.
A. THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BATTERER ENGAGES IN FORFEITURE BY
WRONGDOING
There is no question that defendants often procure victim-wit-
nesses' unavailability in domestic violence trials. 14 1 Studies indicate
that 80% of domestic violence victims refuse to testify or recant their
earlier statements to the police about the violent incident for which
the defendant is charged. 14 2 Victims report that their refusal to tes-
tify stems from fear of additional violence, concern over present or
prior threats not to disclose to police or prosecutors, economic coer-
cion, and anxiety about the safety of their children or family
members. 143
137. Id.
138. See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747,
806-12 (2005); Adam M. Krischer, Though Justice May Be Blind, It Is Not Stupid: Ap-
plying Common Sense to Crawford in Domestic Violence Cases, PROSECUTOR, Dec. 2004,
at 14, 15-16; Chris Hutton, Sir Walter Raleigh Revised: The Supreme Court Revamps
Two Decades of Confrontation Clause Precedent in Crawford v. Washington, 50 S.D. L.
REV. 41, 71 (2005).
139. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 14.
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As a result, domestic violence prosecutions are more challenging
and convictions are harder to obtain. 1 44 Domestic violence tends to
occur in private and with few, if any, witnesses other than the vic-
tim. 145 In fact, the majority of domestic violence cases are dependant
on the testimony of the victim. Without the victim's testimony, many
prosecutions are unable to proceed and charges are dismissed. 146 Due
to the batterer's efforts at preventing the victim from testifying, the
State is often unable to present the question of accountability for the
defendant's conduct to a neutral fact-finder. Domestic violence de-
fendants, as with all defendants who engage in wrongdoing to procure
witnesses' absences, are engaged in behavior designed to disrupt and
undermine the criminal justice system, the very system society cre-
ated to hold people accountable for their antisocial behavior. 147
In a similar fashion to charged defendants, many domestic vio-
lence batterers seek to avoid responsibility for their behavior. The
batterer employs the same behaviors as the domestic violence
defendant.
The battering relationship is not about conflict between two
people; rather, it is about one person exercising power and
control over the other. Battering is a pattern of verbal and
physical abuse, but the batterer's behavior can take many
forms. Common manifestations of that behavior include im-
posing economic or financial restrictions, enforcing physical
and emotional isolation, repeatedly invading the victim's pri-
vacy, supervising the victim's behavior, terminating support
from family or friends, threatening violence toward the vic-
tim, threatening suicide, getting the victim addicted to drugs
or alcohol, and physically or sexually assaulting the victim.
The purpose of the abusive behavior is to subjugate the vic-
tim and establish the batterer's superiority. 148
The result of the batterer's behavior is that the victim has great diffi-
culty safely leaving the relationship and does not disclose the true na-
ture of the relationship to friends, family, police, or prosecutors.' 4 9
144. DONALD J. REBOVICH, PROSECUTION RESPONSE TO DoMESTIC VIOLENCE: RESULTS
OF A SURVEY OF LARGE JURISDICTIONS 59 (Eve S. Buzawa et al. eds., 1996).
145. Laurie S. Kohn, Barriers to Reliable Credibility Assessments: Domestic Violence
Victim-Witnesses, 11 Am. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 733, 741 (2003).
146. Lininger, 91 VA. L. REV. at 749-50; Robert C. Davis, Victim/Witness Noncoop-
eration: A Second Look at a Persistent Phenomenon, 11 J. CRIM. JUST. 287, 288 (1983)
(indicating that 60% of domestic violence cases are dismissed due to non-participation of
the victims).
147. Krischer, PROSECUTOR, Dec. 2004, at 14 (stating "domestic violence almost al-
ways involves forfeiture.").
148. Andrew J. King-Ries, Crawford v. Washington: The End of Victimless Prosecu-
tion?, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 301 (2005) (citations omitted).
149. King-Ries, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. at 304, 333.
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There is congruence between behaviors by defendants to prevent
testimony and behaviors of batterers to prevent disclosure about the
true nature of the relationship. At bottom, batterers and defendants
often seek the same thing: to avoid responsibility for their criminal
conduct. Defendants want to avoid conviction. Batterers want to pre-
serve the relationship, by definition a relationship established and
maintained by criminal conduct. 150 Therefore, it is possible to de-
scribe a battering relationship as a form of forfeiture by wrongdoing: a
fundamental pillar of many battering relationships is procuring the
absence (inability to disclose) of the recipient of the criminal conduct
and the primary witness to the true nature of the relationship.
In a broad sense, then, it seems appropriate to assert defendants'
forfeiture by wrongdoing in domestic violence prosecutions. As Fried-
man says, forfeiture by wrongdoing should apply to "conduct by a de-
fendant that prevents his confrontation with a prosecution witness by
making it impossible or infeasible for the witness . . . to be at the
trial."15 1 Friedman's definition fits the majority of domestic violence
relationships and prosecutions. A closer examination of the elements
of forfeiture as applied to domestic violence prosecutions is critical to
accurately assess the usefulness of forfeiture as a solution to Craw-
ford's potential elimination of victimless prosecutions.
B. THE ELEMENTS OF FORFEITURE IN A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
CONTEXT
To be a solution to Crawford15 2-or to replicate the functional
utility of victimless prosecutions-forfeiture by wrongdoing must be
150. Kathleen Finley Duthu, Why Do You Need to Know About Domestic Violence?
How Attorneys Can Recognize and Address the Problem, 53 LA. B. J. 20, 21 (2005) (ex-
plaining "[c]olloquially, the term 'domestic violence' is used synonymously with 'bat-
tering' and refers to intentional acts of physical, sexual, emotional and/or psychological
abuse perpetrated against a current or former intimate or dating partner."); Jane Mas-
low Cohen, Regimes of Private Tyranny: What Do They Mean to Morality and for the
Criminal Law?, 57 U. Prrr. L. REV. 757, 762 (1996) (explaining "[w]hen [physical] vio-
lence becomes a recurring part of [intimate adult] relationships, and especially when it
gives rise to reported or otherwise known injury, the violence is now known as
battering.").
151. Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and the Definition of Chutzpa, 31 ISR. L.
REV. 506, 516 (1997).
152. For purposes of the following discussion, I will focus on forfeiture by wrongdo-
ing as delineated in FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6). It is possible to read Justice Scalia's recog-
nition of forfeiture in Crawford to be far more restricted than FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).
Recall that while Justice Scalia used the term forfeiture by wrongdoing, he cited not to
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) but to Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). See supra
notes 10, 86. From this, it is possible Justice Scalia is envisioning a forfeiture doctrine
that would track closely to Reynolds, particularly the requirement that the evidence be
"competent." The evidence was deemed "competent" in Reynolds because the witness
had testified in a prior trial and been subjected to cross-examination by the defendant.
Since it is more difficult to envision the need for such a restricted forfeiture rule to be
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applicable in at least the same spread of cases. Victimless prosecu-
tions are available when there is competent evidence supporting the
charged crime and the absent victim's statements can be deemed to be
excited utterances, present sense impressions, or statements to medi-
cal personnel. 153 The primary utility of victimless prosecutions is that
they are not limited by degree of injury. Rather, they can address mis-
demeanors or felonies and allow prosecutors to attack a wide variety
of criminal conduct. 154
In addition, to come close to reaching the functional utility of vic-
timless prosecutions, it is essential that forfeiture by wrongdoing be
available in the cases in which the very act the defendant is charged
with is also the basis for the forfeiture. In other words, the reflexive
forfeiture principle must be applicable. 15 5 The reason for this is the
fact that the majority of domestic violence cases are not reported. Sta-
tistics indicate, on average, victims endure five to seven violent inci-
dents before they involve police. 1 56 Victimless prosecutions can apply
even in the "initial" report to the police. The prosecution is able to
admit the absent victim's hearsay statement about the incident form-
ing the basis of the charge. Absent application of the reflexive forfei-
ture principle, the State would not be able to introduce the victim's
statements regarding the charged incident. Instead, the defendant
would have one free bite at the apple and society would be unable to
address a significant portion of domestic violence.
1. Unavailability of Declarant
Courts traditionally apply forfeiture by wrongdoing to situations
in which the declarant has been murdered. 15 7 Clearly, for these types
of domestic violence incidents, the declarant is unavailable to testify.
Given the fact that nearly 2000 people are killed every year by their
construed as an "exception" to a Confrontation Clause rule that requires an opportunity
for prior cross-examination, I am focusing my discussion on the broader forfeiture rule
expressed in FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).
153. King-Ries, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. at 308-11.
154. Lininger, 91 VA. L. REV. at 771 (citing study that indicates that half of all do-
mestic violence prosecutions in California, Washington, and Oregon were victimless
prosecutions relying on absent victims' hearsay statements).
155. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
156. Marina Angel, Criminal Law and Women: Giving the Abused Woman Who Kills
a Jury of Her Peers Who Appreciate Trifles, 33 Am. CraM. L. REV. 229, 285 (1996) (stat-
ing "[a] Kansas City study of spousal homicides found that in 90% of the cases the police
had been called to the home a median of 5 times in response to 'domestic disturbance'
calls.").
157. See supra note 108.
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domestic partners, this element will be satisfied in a significant num-
ber of cases. 158
However, millions of female Americans experience domestic vio-
lence assaults every year. 159 The vast majority of domestic violence
cases result in minor or no permanent, visible injury.16 0 In fact, the
greatest incidence of domestic violence involves misdemeanor level as-
saults.' 6 1 Most felony-level offenses involve risk of death or serious
bodily injury.16 2 In the vast majority of domestic violence cases,
therefore, the victim-declarants are neither dead nor physically inca-
pacitated. While they are physically able to appear and to recount
details about the charged incident, the majority of victims do not tes-
tify. 1 6 3 The victims are not, therefore, unavailable in the manner tra-
ditionally encountered with forfeiture by wrongdoing. In this way,
successful application of forfeiture seems to be limited to the most hei-
158. 1,958 murder victims were killed by members of their family in 2002. U.S.
Dep't of Just., Bureau of Justice Statistics, Family Violence Statistics, available at http:/
/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fvs.pdf (revised June 12, 2005).
159. Joan Zorza, Women Battering: High Costs and the State of the Law, in DoMEs-
TIC VIOLENCE LAW 11, 15 (Nancy K.D. Lemon ed., 2001). Estimates range from one to
four million women a year who will experience an assault by an intimate partner. Com-
pare U.S. Dep't of Just., Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special Report: Violence Against
Women: Estimates from the Redesigned Survey (Aug. 1995), available at http://www.ojp.
usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/femvied.pdf (estimating one million women will suffer a non-fatal
assault from an intimate partner), with Am. Psychol. Ass'n, Violence and the Family:
Report of the American Psychological Association Presidential Task Force on Violence
and the Family, at 10 (1996) (copy on file with author) (estimating four million women
will suffer a serious assault from an intimate partner in a twelve month period).
160. Between 1993 and 1998, 1/3 of victims of intimate partner crime were victims
of threats or attempted violence. U.S. Dep't of Just., Bureau of Justice Statistics, Spe-
cial Report: Intimate Partner Violence (May 2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipv.pdf. Minor injuries or no injuries account for 92.8% of intimate part-
ner violence. U.S. Dep't of Just., Bureau of Justice Statistics, Family Violence Statistics,
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fvs.pdf (revised June 12, 2005).
161. Aggravated assault accounts for 15.5% of family violence arrests, and simple
assaults for 77.4%. U.S. Dep't of Just., Bureau of Justice Statistics, Family Violence
Statistics, available at httpJ/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fvs.pdf (revised June 12,
2005).
162. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.021 (West 2006). Section 9A.36.021
states the following:
(1) A person is guilty of assault in the second degree if he or she, under circum-
stances not amounting to assault in the first degree: (a) Intentionally assaults
another and thereby recklessly inflicts substantial bodily harm; or (b) Inten-
tionally and unlawfully causes substantial bodily harm to an unborn quick
child by intentionally and unlawfully inflicting any injury upon the mother of
such child; or (c) Assaults another with a deadly weapon; or (d) With intent to
inflict bodily harm, administers to or causes to be taken by another, poison or
any other destructive or noxious substance; or (e) With intent to commit a fel-
ony, assaults another; or (f) Knowingly inflicts bodily harm which by design
causes such pain or agony as to be the equivalent of that produced by torture.
§ 9A.36.021.
163. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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nous offenses that produce the most serious consequences for the
victims.
However, the victim's refusal to testify is often a direct result of
the defendant's violence and threats against the victim. 164 The vic-
tims may "choose" to honor their interests in safety and bodily integ-
rity and absent themselves from the trial. In these situations, the
victim's unavailability is more in line with the traditional notions of
unavailability, and it seems appropriate to extend the definition of
unavailability. 165
The situation becomes more complex when the victim's refusal to
testify is a result of more subtle expressions of the defendant's power
and control over the victim. For instance, if the victim has been eco-
nomically isolated and is dependent upon the defendant's income, his
or her decision not to testify likely falls outside the current purview of
unavailability. While creating a small incentive for batterers not to
employ more violent forms of control, limiting unavailability to
threats of violence or use of violence will exclude a significant portion
of domestic violence victims from being "unavailable." It will also
deny the greater reality of domestic violence power and control.
2. Intent to Prevent Declarant from Testifying
The question of the defendant's intent when battering is one not
infrequently encountered in domestic violence prosecutions. The de-
fendant's intent can be conceived in a variety of ways. Is the defen-
dant simply trying to hurt the victim in this instance, is the defendant
attempting to establish or reaffirm the power and control dynamic of
the battering relationship, or is the defendant trying to prevent the
witness from testifying?
Satisfying this element of forfeiture will depend upon how broadly
the defendant's intent is construed. Several courts have held that the
wrongdoing must be done solely for the purpose of preventing testi-
mony.166 Limiting the misconduct to causing the victim pain to pre-
vent his or her testifying in an impending trial will preclude
application of forfeiture. Since the power and control dynamic is de-
signed to subjugate the victim and to prevent disclosure of the abuse,
it seems appropriate to infer that a portion of the defendant's intent is
to prevent the victim from testifying about the nature of the
relationship.
164. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1982) (finding a witness was
unavailable because of being under the control of the defendant).
166. State v. Ivy, No. W2003-00786-CCA-R3-DD, 2004 WL 3021146, at *14 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Dec. 30, 2004).
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3. Declarant is Expected to be a Witness
The major difficulty with this element is the breadth of the read-
ing of "witness." Several courts have taken a narrow reading of "Wit-
ness" and have required that the defendant be trying to prevent the
person from appearing at an actual, initiated hearing. 167 Requiring
two separate acts of violence-one preceding arrest and one preceding
testifying at an initiated hearing pertaining to the first act of violence
that led to arrest-negates the application of reflexive forfeiture by
wrongdoing. 168 Avoiding reflexive forfeiture has the potential to elim-
inate a large portion of forfeiture by wrongdoing's effectiveness in the
domestic violence context.
If "witness" is read broadly-allowing for potential witnesses at a
future uninitiated hearing-this element should easily be satisfied in
most domestic violence situations. Since the victim is often the only
witness to the violence, the defendant is acutely aware of the inculpa-
tory potential of the victim. 16 9 This awareness exists prior to the in-
volvement of the police or prosecution. It is the very potential of
disclosure that the batterer seeks to avoid through the use of the vio-
lence. Therefore, under a broad reading, this element will nearly al-
ways be met in the domestic violence context.
4. Defendant's Conduct Caused Unavailability of Declarant
Application of the forfeiture principle requires the prosecution to
establish by some degree of proof that the defendant's conduct is the
reason the victim-declarant is not available to testify. Clearly this
poses significant problems in a prosecution in which the State is una-
ble to procure the victim's participation at trial.
The first issue is one of attempting to meet the burden of proof. In
the typical non-domestic violence application of the forfeiture by
wrongdoing rules, the link between the defendant's conduct and the
victim's unavailability is established through evidence independent of
the unavailable witness. As the court in Mastrangelo stated, "such
misconduct is invariably accompanied by tangible evidence such as
the disappearance of the defendant, disruption in the courtroom or the
murder of a key witness .... "170
However, in the typical domestic violence incident, the link be-
tween the defendant's conduct and the witness's unavailability is
more difficult to establish. Often, there is little or no independent evi-
167. Id.
168. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
170. United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982).
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dence of the defendant's conduct that is not dependent on the victim
for admission. 1 71
Aside from the practical problems, which by themselves are not
substantial enough to deem the defendant's constitutional right to
confront witnesses forfeited, the situation raises a far more serious
issue of bootstrapping than generally confronted when addressing for-
feiture by wrongdoing. In victimless prosecutions, the prosecution
seeks to admit the victim's statements to responding police officers
about the violent incident. Often, the victim also relayed information
to officers about the nature of his or her abusive relationship with the
defendant, including past threats and violent incidents.17 2 In other
words, the very police contact that produced the statement the prose-
cution seeks to admit is the source of the information regarding the
defendant's conduct that could create the basis for an assertion of for-
feiture by wrongdoing. In addition, due to the nature of the domestic
violence relationship, generally the police and the victim are the only
individuals able to testify about how the defendant is preventing the
victim from testifying. It seems particularly problematic to establish
a defendant's wrongdoing for forfeiture through a victim's statement
regarding his or her relationship to the police investigating an allega-
tion of violence within his or her relationship.
An additional complexity arises from what testimony is permissi-
ble at trial. Often, prosecutors will elicit expert testimony regarding
domestic violence dynamics to help the jury understand the actions of
the domestic violence victim, including a refusal to participate in the
trial.' 73 Is the State permitted to use this type of testimony to estab-
lish forfeiture in the first instance?
V. A CALL FOR AN EXPANDED FORFEITURE BY
WRONGDOING RULE FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
CASES
The current forfeiture by wrongdoing rule may not apply broadly
to domestic violence cases. This, however, runs contrary to our under-
standing of the incredible pressure exerted on domestic violence vic-
tims not to testify and contrary to the underlying principle of
forfeiture by wrongdoing of creating a disincentive for behavior de-
171. Krischer, PROSECUTOR, Dec. 2004, at 15. Krischer does identify the possibility
of proving forfeiture through jailhouse phone calls from domestic violence defendants.
In addition, he suggests looking to emails, letters, caller ID logs, and voicemails. Id.
While these are excellent suggestions, many still require some participation from the
victim to be admitted into court.
172. See Lininger, 91 VA. L. REV. at 808 (discussing how police officers can obtain
information about threats to retaliate for cooperating with law enforcement).
173. Krischer, PROSECUTOR, Dec. 2004, at 16.
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signed to disrupt our criminal justice system. 174 Bridging this gap re-
quires a reconceptualization of forfeiture by wrongdoing in the
domestic violence context to allow far greater application of forfeiture
to domestic violence prosecutions. However, the reconceptualization
of forfeiture must be done with concurrent cognizance of three vital
concerns. First and foremost, society demands continued confidence
in the ability of our criminal justice system to render just verdicts.
This confidence can be maintained only if verdicts are based upon
competent and reliable evidence and fair procedural rules. Second,
the societal epidemic of domestic violence is best addressed when the
State maintains its ability to pursue victimless prosecutions despite
potential narrow readings of Crawford. Third, the State, in pursuing
victimless prosecutions, must recognize a central concern of Crawford:
namely abuse of the system by witnesses who do not testify in court.
Keeping these concerns in mind, it is possible to create an expanded
domestic violence forfeiture by wrongdoing rule that is consistent with
Crawford and advances the dual goals of attacking domestic violence
and ensuring confidence in our criminal justice system.
A. BROAD READING OF THE FORFEITURE ELEMENTS
The first step in a reconceptualization of forfeiture by wrongdoing
requires a broad reading of the four primary elements of the rule. A
broad reading of these elements will address the issues identified ear-
lier and ensure application of forfeiture to the greatest possible num-
ber of domestic violence cases.
1. Unavailability of the Declarant
If the State has charged the defendant with a crime of domestic
violence and the victim fails to appear for trial, a rebuttable presump-
tion that the victim is unavailable should attach. This presumption
stems from our understanding that domestic violence relationships
are built on the defendant's power and control over the victim. The
demonstrated pressure that domestic violence defendants exert on
their victims not to testify additionally supports such a presumption.
In order to move from presumption to a finding of unavailability,
the State must demonstrate two additional requirements. First, the
State must demonstrate diligent efforts to obtain the presence of the
174. Douglas E. Beloof & Joel Shapiro, Let the Truth Be Told: Proposed Hearsay
Exceptions to Admit Domestic Violence Victims' Out of Court Statements as Substantive
Evidence, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 4 (2002) (citing studies indicating eighty percent
of domestic violence victims refuse to participate in prosecutions because "[b]atterers
put hydraulic pressures on domestic violence victims to recant, drop the case, or fail to
appear at trial.").
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victim for court, including service of process or a demonstrated inabil-
ity to accomplish service. Second, the State must satisfy the fourth
element of forfeiture by wrongdoing: the defendant caused the victim's
unavailability. The defense will have the opportunity to rebut the pre-
sumption either by demonstrating that the State did not make suffi-
cient efforts to procure the witness or that the State has not met the
fourth element.
2. Intent to Prevent Declarant from Testifying
Courts should recognize that violence between intimate partners
is designed to establish or maintain power and control in abusive rela-
tionships. Abusive relationships are, by definition, criminal. As such,
one of the batterer's primary purposes in establishing or maintaining
the power and control dynamic is to preserve the illegal relationship
through preventing disclosure of the criminal nature of the
relationship.
Therefore, defendants perpetrate intimate partner violence with
the intent to prevent the declarants from testifying later. Since the
battering relationship is illegal, the defendant's intent to prevent tes-
timony exists from the moment of the first violent act against the vic-
tim. Therefore, the intent element is satisfied in any battering
relationship.
In addition, conceiving of domestic violence relationships in this
way allows for the reflexive application of the forfeiture by wrongdo-
ing doctrine. Since the defendant intended the violence to silence the
victim-including silencing her testimony at a later trial-the same
act can be the basis of the criminal charge and forfeiture by wrongdo-
ing. This reflexive application of the forfeiture doctrine greatly ex-
pands the reach of forfeiture by wrongdoing and significantly
increases its utility in combating domestic violence.
Richard Friedman contends that courts have been too limited in
requiring that the defendant intend to prevent the witness from testi-
fying. Rather, Friedman argues that a broad reading of the defen-
dant's intent is appropriate under the forfeiture principle. According
to Friedman, "[tihis principle applies most obviously when that con-
duct is wrongful, but arguably it applies even when it is not, so long as
a natural and desired consequence of the conduct was the declarant's
inability to testify."175 Friedman goes on to state, "it is [not] neces-
sary, for the principle to apply, that rendering the declarant unavaila-
175. Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and the Definition of Chutzpa, 31 ISR. L.
REV. 506, 518 (1997).
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ble to testify have been the motivating, or the principal, purpose of the
defendant's conduct."176
Friedman's broad reading of the intent requirement clearly covers
the domestic violence situation. Since the power and control dynamic
is designed to subjugate the victim and to prevent disclosure of the
abuse-and it does so-it seems appropriate to infer that a portion of
the defendant's intent is to prevent the victim from testifying about
the nature of the relationship.
3. Declarant is Expected to be a Witness
Interpreting the third element of forfeiture broadly appropriately
places the burden on the defendant for his or her violence. In the
same way that the defendant's intent to prevent the victim from testi-
fying arises at the moment of violence against the victim, the violence
also establishes the expectation that the victim will be a witness.
Similarly, the fact that the defendant is acutely aware of-and trying
actively to prevent-the victim's potential to testify about the criminal
nature of the relationship eliminates the need for an actual prosecu-
tion to have been initiated prior to the act of violence forming the basis
of the forfeiture.
In contrast, a narrow reading of the third element that requires
that the violence be perpetrated after the initiation of the prosecution
denies the reality of the patterned violence within the relationship,
does not adequately address the policy concerns of the forfeiture by
wrongdoing doctrine, and punishes the prosecution. It allows the de-
fendant to rely on the violence to keep the victim from court and then
assert his or her confrontation rights. 17 7 At the same time, the State
is prevented from establishing that the defendant understood at the
time of the abuse, regardless of when it occurred-because of the na-
ture of the violent relationship-that the victim could testify in the
future. This seems particularly unfair because it is not proportional to
a broad reading of "testimonial." If the courts assume a broad reading
of "testimonial," under which the victim will have been deemed to
have acted for purposes of developing testimony, then courts should
adopt a broad reading of the defendant's behavior as well.
176. Friedman, 31 ISR. L. REV. at 518 n.25.
177. Tom Lininger, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 811 (2005) (stating "[clonfrontation rights
should be a shield, not a sword. The defendant should not be able to frighten away
witnesses against him, and then protest their absence when the prosecution seeks to
admit their out-of-court statements.").
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4. Defendant's Conduct Caused the Declarant's Unavailability
The fourth element is the most important in the reconceptualiza-
tion of the forfeiture by wrongdoing for domestic violence prosecu-
tions. As discussed above, there are significant problems of proof with
this element. These difficulties, however, should not trump the defen-
dant's constitutional confrontation rights. Therefore, while a broad
reading of forfeiture is appropriate for domestic violence, the fourth
element will limit the reach of forfeiture in domestic violence cases
and help ensure that the constitutional issues are adequately
addressed.
In this regard, the State can establish the fourth element in one of
two ways. First, the State can establish, by a preponderance of the
evidence, 1 78 that the defendant expressly used or threatened to use
violence to prevent the victim from either reporting the incident or
participating in the prosecution. The specific evidence can come from
statements to the responding police officer, medical personnel, or
other witnesses, or from other evidence such as prior police reports or
court documents. This is consistent with developed forfeiture by
wrongdoing case law and is not a dramatic departure.
If the State has no evidence of the defendant expressly preventing
the victim from testifying, alternatively the State can satisfy the
fourth element by establishing that the defendant and victim were in-
volved in a battering relationship. 17 9 A battering relationship is one
in which there is a pattern of violence repeated over time.18 0 In addi-
tion to violence, other tactics are commonly employed by batterers to
accomplish their power and control over the victim, such as threats of
violence to the victim or family members, intimidation, financial and
familial isolation, rigid adherence to sex role stereotypes, stalking,
surveillance, repeated invasions of privacy, or involving the victim in
criminal activity.'18 If the State can establish that the victim and the
defendant were involved in a battering relationship, the State will
have also established a fundamental aspect of that relationship: the
batterer seeks to prevent the victim from disclosing the true nature of
178. For purposes of this discussion, the preponderance of the evidence standard, as
followed by the majority of circuits, will be applied. Whether the standard is by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence, the same issues apply.
179. Jo Ann Merica, The Lawyer's Basic Guide to Domestic Violence, 62 TEX. B. J.
915, 915 (1999) (stating "[d]omestic violence is a pattern of interaction that includes the
use of physical violence, coercion, intimidation, isolation, and/or emotional, economic, or
sexual abuse by one intimate partner to maintain power and control over the other
intimate partner.")
180. See supra note 150.
181. Merica, 62 TEx. B. J. at 915; National Center for Domestic and Sexual Violence,
Power and Control Wheel, available at http://www.ncdsv.orgimages/Power-and-Con-
trol wheelNCDSV.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2006).
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the relationship.' 8 2 In other words, the State will have established
that the defendant's behavior in the relationship is the reason that the
victim is unavailable for trial. The second alternative to the fourth
element represents a significant expansion beyond current forfeiture
by wrongdoing doctrine.
The importance of the second avenue of proving the link between
the defendant's conduct and the victim's absence is that it recognizes
the complexity and the reality of domestic violence. While the second
alternative will be difficult to prove, given the inherent isolation of the
domestic violence victim from society, it maintains the possibility of
establishing forfeiture when the defendant's wrongdoing is more sub-
tle and non-violent. The second avenue recognizes the contextual na-
ture of the defendant's actions and seeks to recognize the entirety of
the battering relationship. In this way, the second avenue allows the
reconceptualization of forfeiture to embrace the full complexity and
reality of domestic violence.
5. Reliability Component
The final aspect of the reconceptualization of the forfeiture doc-
trine for domestic violence is the addition of a reliability component.
Coupled with the fourth element, this additional requirement should
adequately address the defendant's constitutional concerns.
Traditionally, the forfeiture rule has not required any reliability
considerations.' 8 3 Rather, satisfying forfeiture satisfied both hearsay
issues and confrontation concerns.18 4 As the reconceptualization en-
visions a greatly increased application of forfeiture, the need to sepa-
rately consider reliability grows, particularly with declarants who are
not dead, but absent for more subtle reasons. With a murdered de-
clarant, the court has fewer concerns about other competing reasons
for declarant's absence. When the declarant is alive and absent, addi-
tional concerns arise about the ability of the victim-declarant to take
advantage of liberal forfeiture rules and abuse the system. Addition-
ally, an expanded forfeiture rule requires the jury base its decision on
competent evidence. For these reasons, as forfeiture is expanded, it is
appropriate to impose an additional reliability consideration.
A reliability component could take several forms. For instance, it
could be simply a requirement that the court engage in an Evidence
Rule 403 analysis of whether the probative value of the evidence is
substantially outweighed by other concerns, such as unfair prejudice,
182. See supra notes 13-14, 17, 148, 150, 181 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 89, 101 and accompanying text.
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confusion of the issues, or delay:18 5 However, since the reliability
component is only invoked after the defendant's confrontation rights
have been forfeited, it seems most appropriate to employ the reliabil-
ity consideration that existed prior to Crawford's revitalization of the
Confrontation Clause: the Roberts test.18 6
The Crawford Court found that the Roberts test inappropriately
added an alternative reliability test [to the test required by the Con-
frontation Clause]. 187 The Court did not, however, suggest that the
Roberts test was not appropriate for assessing reliability of statements
outside of the Confrontation Clause. 188 Once forfeiture by wrongdoing
has been established, the Confrontation Clause issues are resolved
and the Roberts test can be appropriately used for assessing the relia-
bility of the statement of the unavailable witness. 18 9 In this way, if
the prosecution can demonstrate that the unavailable victim's state-
ment falls within either a firmly rooted hearsay exception or bears
particular guarantees of trustworthiness, the prosecution will be able
to use the statement as substantive evidence of the charged crime.
One benefit of using the Roberts test in this context is that the
courts already have significant experience using the test.190 In addi-
tion, in the domestic violence context, the Roberts test will allow the
prosecution to rely on its considerable experience with victimless pros-
ecution. Many prosecutors' offices have pursued victimless prosecu-
tions based upon excited utterances, present sense impressions, and
statements to medical personnel. Courts have already determined
that these exceptions to the hearsay rule are firmly rooted hearsay
exceptions. In other words, they are deemed to have sufficient inher-
ent reliability that the jury would be justified in relying on them in
reaching a verdict. In this way, the reliability component advances
the societal interest in confidence in the ability of our criminal justice
system to render just verdicts.
185. See, e.g., United States v. Mayhew, No. 2:03-cr-165, 2005 WL 1847239, at *6
(S.D. Ohio Aug. 5, 2005); United States v. Rivera, 412 F.3d 562, 571 (4th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Honken, No. CR 01-3047-MWB, 2004 WL 3418693, at *22 (N.D. Iowa
July 16, 2004).
186. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
187. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
188. "While Justice Scalia devoted a huge portion of the opinion to lambasting the
Roberts Court, and suggesting that Roberts is unworkable in any context, the Crawford
ruling left Roberts unscathed as the controlling authority for a substantial amount of
hearsay evidence admitted in criminal trials." Lininger, 91 VA. L. REV. at 166-67.
189. Lininger, 91 VA. L. REV. at 766.
190. Lininger, 91 VA. L. REV. at 767 (stating "[in fact, among the approximately 500
federal and state court opinions applying Crawford between March 8, 2004, and Decem-
ber 31, 2004, nearly one-third of the courts reaching the merits have distinguished
Crawford on the ground that the statement in question is not testimonial, and many of
these courts have applied the Roberts framework as if Crawford had never been
decided.").
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Crawford creates perverse incentives for
domestic violence batterer-defendants to absent their victims from
court and then seek dismissal of their charges by raising the Confron-
tation Clause. This is precisely the sort of behavior-and threat to our
criminal justice system-that the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing was
originally designed to eliminate. While considerable resistance can be
anticipated to a broad application of forfeiture by wrongdoing in do-
mestic violence cases, such a broad reading is required when the true
nature of a battering relationship is recognized: batterers seek to pre-
vent disclosure about the relationship, particularly to police or
prosecutors.
The effort to preserve the integrity of the criminal justice system
through a broad application of forfeiture by wrongdoing to domestic
violence cases, however, carries with it the potential to erode the in-
tegrity of the criminal justice system by undermining societal confi-
dence in jury verdicts. To prevent this erosion of a fundamental
aspect of our society, broad application of forfeiture must be coupled
with procedural safeguards, and any statements of an absent victim
must be deemed reliable prior to admission to the jury.
In this way, prosecutors can effectively reach those domestic vio-
lence cases in which the defendants have attempted to manipulate the
system to their advantage. A broad reading of forfeiture by wrongdo-
ing, therefore, has the potential to be a solution to the conundrum cre-
ated by Crawford. Prosecutors will still be able to pursue victimless
domestic violence prosecutions and attempt to hold batterers account-
able, even when the battering has successfully prevented the victim
from testifying. At the same time, forfeiture may provide further am-
munition in the critical battle against domestic violence by deterring
batterers from additional acts of violence.
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